

To Float or to Trail: Evidence on the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes¹

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Abstract

We study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period (1974-2000), using a new *de facto* classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables. In contrast with previous studies, we find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are strongly associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility. For industrial countries, on the contrary, regimes do not appear to have any significant impact on growth. The results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature.

1. INTRODUCTION

The choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance is probably one of the most controversial topics in macroeconomic policy. However, while the implications regarding inflation and policy credibility have received considerable attention, the impact of regimes on economic growth has been the subject of surprisingly little work, probably due to the fact that nominal variables are typically considered to be unrelated to longer-term growth performance.²

Even when the economic literature does suggest a link between exchange rate regimes and growth, it does not provide unambiguous implications as to its sign. On the one hand, the lack of exchange rate adjustments under a peg, coupled with some degree of short-run price rigidity, results in price distortions and misallocation of resources (notably, high unemployment) in the event of real shocks. This mechanism underscores the view that fixed exchange rate regimes induce higher output volatility.³ In addition, as suggested by Calvo (1999) and others, the need to defend a peg in the event of a negative external shock implies a significant cost in terms of real interest rates, as well as increasing uncertainty as to the sustainability of the regime, potentially harming investment prospects. While the

² A notable exception is the inflation rate. See, e.g., De Gregorio (1993) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), for theoretical models, and Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro (1995) and Andrés et al. (1996) for an empirical exploration.

³ The view that flexible regimes are better suited to insulate the economy against real shocks goes back to Friedman (1953) and Poole (1970), among others. This view has found support in the empirical literature. See, e.g., Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Ghosh et al. (1997), and Broda (2000).

implications of these channels in terms of long-run growth performance are not obvious, there is some evidence of a negative link between output volatility and growth.⁴

On the other hand, by reducing relative price volatility, a peg is likely to stimulate investment and trade, thus increasing growth.⁵ Lower price uncertainty, usually associated with fixed exchange rate regimes, should also lead to lower real interest rates, adding to the same effect. Moreover, (credible) fixed exchange rate regimes are usually assumed to contribute to monetary policy discipline and predictability, and to reduce a country's vulnerability to speculative exchange rate fluctuations, all factors that are conducive to stronger growth performance.⁶

Thus, although the literature, if anything, seems to offer stronger arguments favoring the idea that fixed exchange rates may lead to higher growth rates, in the end, the question of whether or not there exists a link between regimes and growth can only be resolved as an empirical matter. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by assessing the relationship between exchange rate regimes and output growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post Bretton Woods period (1974-2000).

⁴ See Ramey and Ramey (1995). Alternatively, Aizenman (1994) argues, in the context of a theoretical model, that higher output volatility as a result of the adoption of a peg may foster investment and growth.

⁵ A survey of the literature on the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade can be found in Edison and Melvin (1990). See also Frankel and Wei (1998) for a more recent study, and Rose (2000), and Frankel and Rose (2000) on its indirect effect on growth.

⁶ See, e.g., Mundell (1995), Calvo (2000a and b) and, for the particular case of currency boards, Ghosh et al. (2000).

Contrary to what might have been inferred from the literature, we find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth. For industrial countries, however, we find that the regime has no significant impact on growth. In addition, our tests confirm the standard view (and previous empirical work) indicating the presence of a negative link between output volatility and exchange rate flexibility for non-industrial countries.

Our main reference comes from the numerous empirical papers on the determinants of growth, from which we borrow our baseline specification.⁷ Also close to our work is the relatively scarce body of literature that directly addresses the relationship between growth and exchange rate regimes. Among the few papers within this group, Mundell (1995) looks at the growth performance for the industrial countries before and after the demise of Bretton Woods, finding that the former period was associated with faster average growth. Rolnick and Weber (1997) using long term historical data, show that output growth was higher under fiat standards than under commodity (e.g., gold) standards. Finally, Ghosh et al. (1997) run growth regressions controlling for the *de jure* exchange rate regime as defined by the IMF, finding no systematic link between the two.⁸

⁷ See, e.g., Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), and references therein.

⁸ However, for some subsamples of countries they find weak evidence that growth rates in fixes are below those in floats. On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2000) find that currency boards, typically assimilated to hard pegs, tend to grow faster.

We improve upon this work in two ways. First, we use a *de facto* classification of exchange rate regimes that better captures the policies implemented by countries regardless of the regime reported by the country's authorities.⁹ In addition, our model specification builds on existing results in the growth literature, focusing on the post-Bretton Woods period and expanding the sample size to include the 90s.

It is important to stress at this point that we do not intend to revisit previous findings in the growth literature nor to assess their sensitivity to various combinations of explanatory variables or to the inclusion of the exchange regime dummies. Instead, we draw on those findings only to obtain a reasonable set of additional controls to use as a benchmark to test whether the exchange rate regime has a significant impact on growth. We find that, for the group of developing countries, this is indeed the case.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the baseline regressions. Section 4 details the results of selected robustness tests. Finally, section 5 discusses possible interpretations, and concludes.

2. THE DATA

Our sample covers annual observations for 183 countries over the period 1974-2000. A list of countries, as well as the definitions and sources for all the variables used in the paper, is presented in Appendix 1. With the exception of the political instability, openness and

⁹ For completeness, however, we also present results for the IMF *de jure* classification on which previous studies were based.

secondary school enrollment variables, all of our data comes from the IMF and the World Bank databases. As data availability varies across countries and periods, tests in each subsection were run on a consistent subsample of observations (which is reported in each case along with the results).

The classification of exchange rate regimes that we use in this paper deserves some comment. Most of the empirical literature on the evolution and implications of alternative exchange rate regimes groups observations according to a *de jure* classification based on the regime that governments *claim* to have in place, as reported by the IMF in its *International Financial Statistics*. This approach, however, ignores the fact that many alleged floats intervene in the exchange market to reduce exchange rate volatility, while some fixers devalue periodically to accommodate independent monetary policies. To address this problem, we use a *de facto* classification of exchange rate regimes, based on cluster analysis techniques, that groups countries according to the behavior of three variables closely related to exchange rate policy: (i) *Exchange rate volatility* (σ_e), measured as the average of the absolute monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate relative to the relevant anchor currency (or basket of currencies, whenever the currency weights are disclosed) over the year; (ii) *Volatility of exchange rate changes* ($\sigma_{\Delta e}$), measured as the standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate; and (iii) *Volatility of reserves* (σ_r), measured as the average of the absolute monthly change in dollar denominated international reserves relative to the dollar value of the monetary base in the previous month.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a complete description of the classification methodology and variable definitions we refer the reader to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) or to the not-for-publication

These variables are computed on an annual basis, so that each country-year observation represents a point in the $(\sigma_e, \sigma_{\Delta e}, \sigma_r)$ space. In this space, floats are associated with little intervention in the exchange rate market (low volatility of reserves) together with high volatility of exchange rates. Conversely, observations with little volatility in the exchange rate variables coupled with substantial volatility in reserves correspond to the group of fixes. Finally, intermediate regimes are expected to exhibit moderate to high volatility across all variables, reflecting exchange rate movements in spite of active intervention. In turn, observations are grouped by proximity using cluster analysis according to the four clusters identified in Table 1. Observations that do not display significant variability in either dimension are judged “inconclusives,” and left unclassified.¹¹

Table 2 shows the regime distribution of the 2291 classified observations, along with the alternative IMF-based classification for the same group of observations. While the two classifications show a similar number of fixed regimes, countries within each group may differ. The table also shows how regimes are identified according to economic development. While industrial countries are more prone to float, non-industrial economies, tend to use intermediate and fixed regimes more prominently: Almost half of non-industrial countries are classified as pegs, whereas for industrial countries fixed regimes amount to about one third of total observations.

Appendix which accompanies this paper. The database is also available at <http://www.utdt.edu/~ely> or <http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen>.

¹¹ Inconclusives, which amount to 698 out of 2989 observations for which there is data for the classification variables, are excluded from the tests. They are used, however, in one of the robustness checks reported in section 4 below.

3. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND GROWTH

A first pass at the data

Table 3 provides a first pass at the data, showing the means and medians of the rate of growth of real per capita GDP (*DGDP*) and its volatility (*GDPV*, measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate over a centered rolling five-year period). Observations are grouped by regime according to both the IMF and the *de facto* classifications. In addition, we show the corresponding statistics for industrial and non-industrial countries.¹² The table includes the 2286 observations (out of 2291 classified by the *de facto* methodology) for which growth data is available. Since the sample includes many countries that exhibit extraordinary growth volatility (due to, for example, wars or transition to market economies) it seems more reasonable to concentrate the analysis in the medians, which are less sensitive to extreme values.

Simple inspection of the numbers anticipates the main results of the paper. Fixed exchange rates substantially underperform floating exchange rate regimes, under both classifications. In particular, the median annual real per capita growth rate drops from 2.2% for floaters to 1.5% for pegs, according to the *de facto* classification, and a similar gap appears using the IMF classification. Note also that the difference in *average* growth, consistent with that of the medians when measured according to the *de facto* classification, has the opposite sign

¹² Industrial and non-industrial economies are listed in Appendix 1.

when based on the IMF. Thus, the *de facto* criterion appears to capture a more consistent connection between regimes and growth.¹³ The aggregate sample, however, masks important differences between industrial and developing countries: As can be seen, the previous result is driven almost entirely by non-industrial observations.

Table 3 also shows that output volatility decreases monotonically with the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime when using the *de facto* classification. This monotonicity property is lost if using the IMF classification. Interestingly, much in the same way as in the case of growth, this link is entirely accounted for by the group of non-industrial countries, while for industrial ones the regime appears to be irrelevant, or, if anything, to work in the opposite direction.

An alternative cut at the data is reported in Table 4. Here, we split countries into two groups, fast- and slow-growers, according to whether their average growth performance over the period 1974-2000 was below or above the median. We then examine whether any of these groups is characterized by adopting a particular exchange rate regime. To do that, we identify a country as fix (non-fix) whenever it is assigned a fixed (float or intermediate) regime in more than 50% of its available observations. We find that fixes account for 40% of the fast growers and 48% of the slow growers, again suggesting the presence of a negative link between pegs and growth. Once again, this link is entirely confined to the group of non-industrial countries. Moreover, note that fast-growing countries within this group are also characterized by smaller output volatility.

¹³ This may be behind the fact that previous studies based on the IMF's *de jure* classification failed to find any significant impact of exchange regimes on growth.

Growth regressions

We explore the robustness of our initial pass at the data by running a pooled regression for all country-year observations for which data is available. Since it is not our intention to reexamine results profusely analyzed in the growth literature, we choose what we regard as a relatively non-controversial specification of the growth regression, to which we add the exchange rate regime dummies, *INT* (intermediates) and *FIX* (fixed exchange rates).¹⁴

Regression results are presented in Table 5.¹⁵ As can be seen the control variables behave largely as expected. Real per capita growth (*DGDP*) is positively correlated with both the investment-to-GDP ratio (*INVGDP*) and the rate of change of the terms of trade (*DTT*),¹⁶ and negatively correlated with the growth of government consumption (*DGOV(-1)*, lagged to avoid potential endogeneity problems), and political instability (*CIVIL*). Initial per capita GDP (*GDP74*, computed as the average over the period 1970-1973) also comes out with a negative coefficient indicating the presence of conditional convergence. Population (*POP*), a measure of size, appears positively related to growth. The introduction of this control variable is particularly important, since the choice of exchange rate regimes is usually closely linked to country size. Secondary enrollment (*SEC*), population growth (*POPGR*),

¹⁴ Our baseline specification follow closely those reported in Levine and Renelt (1992), which include the variables most frequently found in the empirical growth literature.

¹⁵ Standard errors reported in the table are corrected by heteroskedasticity, since a simple White-test rejected in all cases the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.

¹⁶ While this variable is generally excluded from cross-section regressions, it makes sense to include it when, as in this case, regressions are run on annual data.

and openness (*OPENFR*) are not significant, in contrast with previous findings.¹⁷ In all cases, we include three regional dummies: Sub-Saharan Africa (*SAFRICA*), Latin America (*LATAM*) and transition economies (*TRANS*), as well as year dummies (the coefficients of which are omitted for conciseness).¹⁸

The coefficients of the regime dummies are consistent with the findings of the previous subsection. As a benchmark, we show in the first column the result of the test when regimes are assigned according to the IMF criterion: intermediate regimes grow significantly more than the rest with no difference between floaters and fixers.¹⁹

¹⁷ See, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Edwards (1991). However, Levine and Renelt (1992) cast doubt on the robustness of these links. In order to assure the exogeneity of the openness measure we use Frankel and Romer's (1999) exogenous trade share. The results are basically the same when more traditional measures are used.

¹⁸ It is important to emphasize at this point that the impact of exchange rate regimes reported in this paper proved to be robust to the inclusion of many other alternative controls suggested by the growth literature. These included the inflation rate, primary school enrollment, the ratio of exports and of imports to GDP, export and import growth, the GDP share of government consumption, the growth of domestic credit, and the ratio of central government deficit to GDP, among others. The results, omitted here, are available from the authors upon request.

¹⁹ For the sake of comparison, the IMF regression includes only those observations that are also classified under the *de facto* methodology. Although we use a different sample, these results are comparable to those obtained in Ghosh et al. (1997), also based on the IMF classification.

In contrast, the results based on the *de facto* classification unveil a different picture. The regression for the full sample indicates that *growth rates are significantly higher for floaters than for less flexible regimes*. Indeed, the coefficient of the fix dummy indicates that fixers grow on average close to 0.78% per year less than floaters.²⁰ This suggests that, everything else equal, a country that systematically opted to float its exchange rate after the demise of Bretton Woods would have ended up in 2000 with an output 22% larger than one that chose to fix.

A more careful analysis, however, reveals that the negative impact of pegs on growth is entirely accounted for by the group of non-industrial economies. In fact, for these countries, the coefficient of the fix dummy is larger in absolute value than for the general sample, indicating that the average growth rate of pegs is more than 1% below that of floats. For industrial countries, on the other hand, neither of the dummies is statistically significant, suggesting that the exchange rate regime is largely irrelevant in these cases.

Given the obvious differences between results conditioning on *de jure* and *de facto* regimes, one may wonder whether and to what extent our findings are driven by a particular classification. However, a simple and rather crude test shows that the *de jure* criterion yields basically the same result once potentially misclassified observations are excluded. More precisely, we restrict the sample to relatively uncontroversial *de jure* fixes and floats. The former include all *de jure* fixes with almost no nominal exchange rate variability (in

²⁰ Note the similarity between the coefficient of the regime dummy and the difference in the median growth differential between fixers and floaters in Table 3, despite the fact that the numbers in Table 3 cover a much larger set of countries.

the notation of Table 1, σ_e) while the latter comprises *de jure* floats associated with low values of the intervention variable (σ_r).²¹

The last column of Table 5 reports a fix vs. float regression using this “uncontroversial” IMF sample. An identical regression, using the full IMF sample data, is also presented for comparison in column (v).²² As the table shows, the link between regimes and growth, absent when the *de jure* classification is taken at face value, is highly significant after excluding a relatively few (55 out of 840) suspect observations. It is reassuring to see that, as expected, the negative link between regimes and growth is not specific to a particular classification.

Output volatility

To examine the relationship between exchange rate regimes and output volatility, we run regressions exploiting the links suggested by the growth literature. The volatility of real per capita output growth (*GDPV*) is regressed against the volatilities of the investment ratio (*INVGDV*), the change in government consumption (*GOVV*), and the terms of trade

²¹ The crude criteria used to pick these uncontroversial observations is not themselves uncontroversial. For “true” fixes (floaters), we require exchange rate (reserves) variability to be below the median for the whole sample (the thresholds are $\sigma_e < 0.3\%$ and $\sigma_r < 6.0\%$, respectively). It has to be noted, however, that different (and reasonable low) thresholds for σ_e and σ_r yield comparable results.

²² *De jure* intermediates cannot be restricted in an uncontroversial way, and are hence excluded in both regressions.

(*TTV*), as well as against measures of openness (*OPENFR*), initial wealth (*GDP74*), and political instability (*CIVIL*). As before, we include regional and year dummies.²³

The results are reported in Table 6. For the whole sample, the coefficients of all regressors are positive, indicating that higher volatility in macroeconomic fundamentals is associated with higher volatility of GDP. Initial GDP, volatility in investment, government consumption and terms of trade, the measure of civil liberties and the regional dummies are all significant.

As already documented in the literature, the table also shows that fixed regimes are associated with higher output volatility. However, a closer look reveals that this association is, again, driven by non-industrial countries.²⁴ Somewhat surprisingly, for industrial countries the result goes in the opposite direction, both intermediate and fixed exchange rate regimes being characterized by lower output volatility.

Thus, in contrast with what the literature tells us, the evidence on the relationship between output volatility and exchange rate regimes is in fact rather mixed. More precisely, much in

²³ Two countries with exceptional output volatility, Jordan and Rwanda, were excluded from the sample.

²⁴ Except for the openness measure that becomes significant, the rest of the coefficients remain relatively stable when we move from the whole sample to the group of non-industrial countries, with the exception of the initial GDP level (*GDP74*), whose coefficient more than doubles in value. This may be associated with the fact that the more financially developed emerging economies, which have been subject to considerable external shocks particularly during the nineties, tend to be at the high income end within this group.

the same way as in the case of growth rates, the positive association between fixes and higher output volatility appears to be restricted to developing countries.

4. ROBUSTNESS

The volatility results discussed above, while mixed, were broadly consistent with the existing literature and empirical evidence. However, the growth results presented in the previous section, while also consistent with at least some of the hypothesis advanced in the literature, are nonetheless controversial. Thus, it is crucial to examine the robustness of the growth results and their sensitivity to alternative specifications.

This section summarizes the various robustness checks that we run to address some of the potential concerns that our findings may give rise to. In particular, we discuss: (a) cross-section regressions covering the whole period, to ensure that the link unveiled using annual data is not driven by short-term cyclical factors, (b) a distinction between high and low credibility pegs, (c) the inclusion of additional macroeconomic variables and changes in the sample to test for possible omitted variables, and (d) a correction for potential regime endogeneity.²⁵ We address each of these checks in turn.

²⁵ The result survived several other robustness checks not reported in the paper for the sake of brevity, such as the exclusion of countries with very high or very low growth rates, the use of subsamples covering shorter periods, or the exclusion of countries with population below certain thresholds.

Cross section analysis

The basic motivation for our choice of frequency was the fact that regimes tend to change rather rapidly over time, making a longer-term regime classification less informative.

However, there is an ample literature that stresses the short-run impact of changes in the exchange rate regime on output performance. Thus, a potential criticism may arise from the fact that we use annual data to assess the impact on growth, possibly reflecting the short-term effect of a change in the exchange rate regime, rather than a long-term association between regimes and growth. For example, exchange rate based stabilizations are known to generate short-term output expansions. Similarly, economic performance in the aftermath of a currency collapse may wrongly be assigned to a flexible regime while the origins lay in the preceding period.²⁶ To address this concern, we estimate single cross section regressions à la Barro (1991), using averages of the relevant variables over the period 1974-2000, except for those measured at the beginning of period (*GDP74* and *SEC*).

The main difficulty posed by this exercise is the computation of the exchange rate regime dummy for those countries that changed their exchange rate policy over the years. We do this in two alternative ways. First we use, for each country, the frequency with which it is classified as a fix (*PERCFIX*). More precisely, according to this measure a value of 1 (0) would correspond to a country for which all available observations are classified as fix (float or intermediate). Second, we use the simple average (*LYSAVG*) of a classification

²⁶ See, e.g., the extensive literature on exchange rate- vs. money-based stabilization as in Calvo and Vegh (1994a and b), Kiguel and Liviatan (1991) and Vegh (1992), to name just a few. On the temporariness of exchange rate choices see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and particularly, Frankel (1999).

index that assumes the values 1, 2 or 3 whenever an observation is classified as float, intermediate or fix, respectively. In both cases, a negative coefficient would indicate a negative association between pegs and long-run growth.²⁷

Table 7 presents the results. To confirm that the findings reported in the paper are not due to differences in the data, we start from a barebones specification that replicates Levine and Renelt's (1992) "base" specification, and obtain comparable results despite the fact that we use a shorter sample period.²⁸ Note also that, when the regime dummy is added to this basic set of regressors (column iii), it is still highly significant and of the expected sign. We next take this "base" specification including the regime dummy, and expand the sample to include the 90s (column iv). The results remain unchanged. Finally, in column (v) and (vi), we go back to our baseline specification (similar to that of column (ii) in Table 5) minus the annual change in terms of trade.²⁹ Again, countries that behaved more frequently as fixes displayed slower average growth rates over the period, a result that is entirely attributable to the sub-group of non-industrial countries. In column (vii) we replicate regression (vi) this

²⁷ Note that the average measure *LYSAVG* is hampered by the fact that, as the results in Table 5 suggest, the relationship between regime flexibility and growth may not necessarily be monotonic.

²⁸ Levine and Renelt's (1992) "base" specification include those variables that are found in most empirical studies and that can thus be regarded as less controversial (denoted as I-variables in their paper). For the sake of comparison, in column (i) of Table 7 we present Levine and Renelt's results, reproduced from column (i) of Table 5 in their paper.

²⁹ As can be seen, some of the coefficients lose their significance, which goes in line with the sensitivity of traditional growth regressors to the choice of sample and the combination of explanatory variables already stressed in Levine and Renelt (1992).

time using the simple average of the classification index for each particular country (*LYSAVG*) as a regime proxy. As the table shows, the new regime measure yields comparable results.³⁰

High credibility pegs

The *de facto* methodology leaves unclassified a number of countries that display very little variability in both the nominal exchange rate and the stock of reserves. It could be argued that credible fixes are less likely to be tested by the market (hence exhibiting a lower volatility of reserves) and, possibly for the same reason, more likely to benefit from a stronger growth performance.³¹ If so, by leaving out the so-called “inconclusives,” we would be ignoring this credibility dimension and discarding many “good pegs,” thus biasing the results towards a negative association between fixed regimes and growth.

A natural way to address this concern is to include these “high credibility” pegs in our regressions. Since the *de facto* approach is silent as to the regime to be assigned to these

³⁰ Replacing *PERCFIX* by *LYSAVG* in the other regressions in the Table provides identical results, omitted here for brevity. Note that, because of the way in which these dummies are constructed, their coefficients are not directly comparable with each other or with those in the previous sections.

³¹ This argument underlies the view that “hard pegs” (economies with a currency board or with no separate legal tender), are preferred to “soft pegs” (economies with conventional, adjustable, pegs). On this, see Fischer (2000), Calvo (2000b), Eichengreen and Hausman (1999). Ghosh et al. (2000) provides empirical evidence in favor of “hard pegs.”

observations, we simply classified as fixes all those *de facto* inconclusives that did not exhibit changes in their exchange rates, as well as those classified by the IMF as de jure fixes which exhibit an average monthly movement in the exchange rate of less than 0.1%. In addition we also added countries that comply with the above criteria, even if reserve data are not available.³²

The two columns of Table 8 report the results of our baseline regression, this time using the expanded group of pegs. The results improve dramatically as the sample size increases. Column (i) shows that while the negative impact of fixed exchange rate regimes decreases somewhat in absolute value, the results remain basically unchanged. Alternatively, we include a new dummy (*UNCONT*) that takes the value of one for these uncontroversial pegs. The value of this term should capture any differential effect on growth corresponding to the presence of a high credibility peg. As shown in column (ii), this new dummy is not significant, suggesting that the distinction between low and high credibility pegs is largely irrelevant as a determinant of growth.

Additional macroeconomic variables

It may be argued that countries with the worst economic fundamentals and policy track records are the ones most likely to adopt a peg at any point in time, either in an attempt to gather some policy credibility or as a way to reduce the volatility that results from the lack

³² Out of the 698 “inconclusives” identified by the *de facto* methodology, 625 qualify as fixes according to this criterion. In addition we add 419 cases for which reserve data were not available. See the not-for-publication Appendix for a description of the extended sample.

of such credibility. We do not believe this to be a serious threat to our results, since they are robust to the inclusion of nearly all the variables found to be relevant by the growth literature. Moreover, the use of a *de facto* classification should dispel concerns about fixed exchange rates faring worse than their more flexible counterparts due to the presence of currency or banking crises, since failed pegs are by construction excluded from the fixed exchange rate group.

However, in order to address this potential omitted variable problem we conducted two additional tests. First, to control for weak macroeconomic fundamentals, we included inflation ($INF(-1)$, lagged to reduce potential endogeneity problems), and dummies for currency crises ($CURR$), and bank runs ($BANK$). Both crises variables are taken from Glick and Hutchison (1999) who construct a currency crash and speculative attack variable and extend Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) measure of banking crises.

As can be seen in column (i) of Table 9, both the currency crisis and the bank run variables are significant and of the expected negative sign. While the coefficients of the regime dummies are somewhat smaller in absolute value, the exchange rate regime remains a strongly significant determinant of growth performance. This conclusion is further confirmed in column (iii), which presents the results of a similar test using a single cross section regression, where now inflation (INF) represents the period average.³³

In the same line, one could argue that many low income countries with strict capital controls tend to report a fixed exchange rate regime that is valid only “on paper”. In those

³³ The other variables are also averaged over the period. As before, the change in the terms of trade is excluded.

cases, pervasive exchange rate controls (with the associated black market premium), quotas and other trade restrictions are commonplace, and play the role that a floating rate would in less regulated environments. If this were the case, our results would be biased against fixed regimes, which may be capturing, spuriously, the negative growth impact of these restrictions. To address this concern we split the non-industrial sample into high and low per capita income, according to whether GDP per capita in 1974 was above or below the median for that year. The underlying hypothesis is that richer countries are less likely to resort to extreme forms of capital controls. As can be seen in Table 10, the results hold surprisingly well for the high income group where capital controls should be less important. In addition, the exchange rate regime-growth is still significant once the sample is further restricted to the 90s (when capital controls became less pervasive) and after the additional macroeconomic variables used in Table 9 are also included (columns ii and iii).

Dealing with endogeneity

The previous tests have documented a robust association between fixed exchange rate regimes and economic growth. However, one may still be worried about the possibility that our results may be reflecting reverse causation, that is, a relationship that goes from growth to the choice of exchange rate regime. We believe that this problem should be relatively minor for a number of reasons. As we discussed above, the economic literature has not associated the choice of regime to growth performance, nor has it considered growth as a major determinant of the exchange rate regime.³⁴

³⁴ Edwards (1996) and Frankel (1999) review the determinants of exchange rate regimes, and growth performance is patently missing from the discussion.

Moreover, while one can conceive the case in which the collapse of an unsustainable fixed regime gives way to the recovery of economic fundamentals and the resumption of growth, the empirical literature on financial crises has long linked poor growth with the occurrence of speculative attacks and currency and banking crisis, a channel that is likely to induce a *negative* correlation between growth and exchange rate variability, thus going in the opposite direction of our results.³⁵ Correcting for endogeneity could therefore strengthen the results for the fixed group. Similarly, (exchange rate-based) stabilizations that induced an output contraction in the short run may be contributing to create the negative correlation shown by our results. Again, the literature tends to argue against this, indicating that exchange rate-based stabilizations have been largely expansionary in the short run.

At any rate, it should be noted that short-run effects arising from the regime changes should disappear once we consider long-run averages as we did in the single cross section regressions above. This notwithstanding, our analysis would not be complete if we did not address potential endogeneity problems. We do it in two alternative ways.

First, we test whether our results hold for countries that have had in place a *de jure* fixed regime since the demise of Bretton Woods period. Since in practice this group corresponds to economies within long-standing currency unions, it seems reasonable to assume that in this case the original regime choice was independent from the growth performance of individual countries during our period of analysis. In column (i) of Table 11, we present the

³⁵ This literature, however, is relatively silent on causality. See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Hardy and Pazarbazioglu (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky et al. (1998), among many others.

results of the baseline specification, this time including a dummy, *FIXALL*, that singles out observations associated with countries with *de jure* pegs throughout the period. As can be seen, the negative impact of fixed regimes on growth performance is not reverted for this group of countries.

As an alternative robustness check, we use a feasible generalized two-stage IV estimator (2SIV) suggested by White (1984). White's procedure provides the most efficient among all IV estimators, allowing at the same time to correct for heteroskedasticity, a problem that we found present in our baseline specification. The methodology requires finding instruments for the regime dummies, and implementing a two-stage procedure. Once consistent estimates of the error terms are obtained, they are used to estimate the variance covariance matrix that is used to compute the estimator that maximizes efficiency while taking into account the potential heteroskedasticity problem.

In order to obtain a cleaner test of the impact of pegs, we apply 2SIV to the baseline specification of Table 5.³⁶ In the first step, we run a multinomial logit model of the *FIX* and *INT* regime dummies on all the variables included in the growth regression, plus some additional exogenous controls. The choice of these controls is crucial and deserves some comment.

The extension of the growth literature makes it particularly difficult to find variables that have not been related to growth at some point in time, thus casting doubt at their value as

³⁶ Similar results are obtained when intermediates are excluded. The results, reported in a previous version of this paper, point in a similar direction and are omitted here for conciseness.

instruments for the purposes of our test.³⁷ For this reason, we restricted ourselves to the use of a few clearly exogenous variables, including the ratio of the country's GDP over the US's (*SIZE*), the geographical area of the country (*AREA*), an island dummy (*ISLAND*), defined as a dummy for countries with no mainland territory, the level of reserves relative to the monetary base (*RESBASE*) for the earliest year within the period for which data are available and, finally, a regional exchange rate indicator (*REGEXCH*) equal to the average exchange rate regime of the country's neighbors, where the latter are defined as those under the same IMF department.³⁸ Both size measures are potentially related to the exchange rate regime by the usual argument that smaller countries tend to be more open and thus favor fixed exchange rates. The island variable may relate either to the extraordinary trade propensity of island economies or to their frequent role as international financial centers. A high initial level of reserves has been stressed as a condition for a country to sustain credible pegs. Finally, the regional exchange rate may indicate explicit or implicit exchange rate coordination with countries that typically share strong trade links, as the trade literature has profusely illustrated through the use of gravity models.

³⁷ This is the case, for example, of the financial depth proxies that were used in previous versions of this paper.

³⁸ For the computation of this last instrument, the home country is excluded in the computation of the average. Alternative geographical groupings (e.g., continents) yielded identical results.

Table 12 reports the coefficients for these new variables from the logit model. With a few exceptions, all of these variables are highly significant and of the expected sign (a positive implying a higher propensity to fix).³⁹

From the logit model we obtain predicted probabilities for fixed (*FIXFIT*) and intermediate (*INTFIT*) regimes, which are then used as instrument for the regime dummies *FIX* and *INT* in our baseline growth regression. In turn, this regression provides the consistent estimates of the error terms from which we compute the White's efficient covariance matrix and 2SIV estimator.⁴⁰

The results are presented in the second and third columns of Table 11. As the table shows, the negative association between fixed regimes and growth is robust to the correction for endogeneity. Indeed, as was expected from the above discussion, the correction increases the negative impact of pegs on growth, raising the coefficient from close to 0.8% to more than 2%. In column (iv) the table also reports a simple instrumental variables regression using the regime determinants *AREA*, *ISLAND REGEXCH*, *RESBASE* and *SIZE* (instead of *FIXFIT* and *INTFIT*) as instruments of *FIX* and *INT*. As can be seen, the results remain basically unchanged although the coefficient becomes suspiciously high. In sum, the presence of a strong independent link that goes from the choice of a peg to a poorer growth performance appears to be robust to potential endogeneity problems.

³⁹ The result do not change if different combinations of the proposed instruments are considered. Results are available from the authors upon request.

⁴⁰ Appendix 2 shows the exact specification of this covariance matrix, as well as a more detailed description of the methodology.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper tried to provide evidence on the implications of the choice of a particular exchange rate regime on economic growth. In contrast with previous findings, ours strongly suggest that exchange rate regimes indeed matter in terms of real economic performance for non-industrial countries, while this link appears to be much weaker for industrial economies. In particular, we found that, for the former, fixed exchange rate regimes are connected with slower growth rates and higher output volatility, an association that proved to be robust to several alternative specifications and checks.

While we have not specifically tested the hypotheses supporting the existence of a positive link between fixed exchange rates and trade surveyed in Frankel (1999), it is clear that whatever beneficial influence this might have on growth is not sufficient to generate a net positive impact on economic growth. Similarly, the alleged gains in terms of policy stability and predictability frequently attributed to fixed regimes, if present, are at odds with the higher output volatility that characterizes them.

Of the two arguments mentioned in the introduction that point to a negative effect of fixing, the idea that pegs may be subject to costly speculative attacks relates to Calvo's (1999) claim that the external shocks suffered by a country are not unrelated to their exchange rate regime. According to this view, conventional pegs may be exposed to larger and more frequent shocks. In turn, the fix dummy may be capturing the impact of this additional external volatility much in the same way as the political variables in traditional growth equations capture the implications of institutional instability. Two points, however, cast

doubt on this potential interpretation of our results. On the one hand, these additional shocks were to some extent tested by controlling for the occurrence of currency and banking crises. In fact, while these variables were found to be significant, their inclusion reduced the size and significance of the regime dummy only marginally. On the other hand, long-standing, high credibility pegs that presumably are less affected by frequent external shocks did not appear to fare better in terms of growth than their more vulnerable counterparts.

The more traditional argument linking fixed exchange rate with higher output volatility appears to be more promising, particularly in light of our findings that economies where regimes do have an effect on output growth are the same as those for which it appears to affect its volatility. In turn, this is consistent with the empirical evidence of a negative correspondence between output volatility and growth mentioned in the introduction. An alternative, related, hypothesis points at a combination of fixed exchange rate regimes and downward price rigidity that, in turn, may induce an asymmetric response to real shocks, in the form of output contractions when they are negative and price adjustment when they are positive. A careful examination of this relatively unexplored channel may help understand the links unveiled in this paper.⁴¹

The model also casts a negative light on intermediate regimes, which display a relatively poor growth performance compared to floats. However, as this result does not survive an endogeneity correction, our conclusions on this front have to be taken with caution.

⁴¹ Using a VAR approach, Broda (2000) finds that, under fixed regimes, responses to positive and negative terms of trade shocks tend to differ, although not significantly.

Dornbusch (2000), however, disregards this channel as a potentially important factor.

As it stands, the paper opens more questions than it answers. If we accept the results reported here, one can only wonder why countries have opted so pervasively for unilateral pegs. Different cuts at the sample, both in terms of countries and periods, will eventually help illuminate the origins of the result. At this point, however, one should be cautious not to read in our results the policy implication that countries should massively adopt floating exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rates may in some cases report substantial gains in terms of credibility and inflation performance, particularly in a high inflation context. Additionally, the costs of the transition to a float are not minor and depend heavily on initial conditions. For example, for countries with widespread financial dollarization, a move to a flexible regime may increase output volatility due to the balance sheet effect of fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. Similarly, our findings are not incompatible with the advocacy of “hard pegs” or full dollarization. Many of the benefits of having a common currency or undertaking outright dollarization are not shared by unilateral pegs, transaction costs being just one example. This notwithstanding, we believe that the evidence presented here is strong enough to influence the debate on exchange rate regimes in the future.

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APPENDIX 1

(a) Variables and Sources

Variable	Definitions and sources
ΔGDP	Rate of growth of real per capita GDP (Source: World Economic Outlook [WEO])
ΔTT	Change in terms of trade - exports as a capacity to import (constant LCU) (Source: World Development Indicators [WDI]; variable NY.EXP.CAPM.KN)
AREA	Land area (sq km) (Source: WDI; variable AG.LND.TOTL.K2)
BANK	Banking crises (Source: Glick and Hutchison, 1999)
CIVIL	Index of civil liberties (measured on a 1 to 7 scale, with one corresponding to highest degree of freedom) (Source: Freedom in the World - Annual survey of freedom country ratings)
CURR	Currency crises (Source: Glick and Hutchison, 1999)
GDP74	Initial per capita GDP (average over 1970-1973) (Source: WEO)
GDPV	Standard deviation of the growth rate over a centered rolling five-year period
GOV(-1)	Growth of government consumption (lagged one period) (Source: IMF's International Financial Statistics [IMF])
GOVV	Standard deviation of the growth of government consumption over a centered rolling five-year period
INF	Annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index (Source: IMF).
INVGDP	Investment to GDP ratio (Source: IMF)
INVGDPV	Standard deviation of the investment to GDP ratio over a centered rolling five-year period
ISLAND	Dummy variable for countries with no mainland territory.
LATAM	Dummy variable for Latin American countries
OPEN	Openness, (ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP) (Source: IMF).
OPENFR	Constructed Openness (Source: Frankel and Romer, 1999)
POP	Total Population (units) (Source: WDI, variable SP.POP.TOTL)
POPGR	Population growth (annual %) (Source: WDI, variable SP.POP.GROW)
REGEXCH	Average de facto exchange rate regime of the region
RESBASE	Initial Ratio of International Reserves to monetary base (Source: IMF).
SAFRICA	Dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries
SEC	Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary education (Source: Barro, 1991)
SIZE	GDP in dollars over US GDP (Source: IMF).
TRANS	Dummy variable for Transition economies
TTV	Standard deviation of the terms of trade over a centered rolling five-year period.

(b) List of Countries (183-country sample)

Australia	Burkina Faso	Jamaica	Philippines
Austria	Burundi	Jordan	Poland
Belgium	Cambodia	Kazakhstan	Qatar
Canada	Cameroon	Kenya	Romania
Denmark	Cape Verde	Kiribati	Russia
Finland	Central African Rep.	Korea	Rwanda
France	Colombia	Kuwait	Samoa
Germany	Comoros	Kyrgyz Republic	Sao Tome & Principe
Greece	Congo, Dem. Rep. Of	Lao People's Dem.Rep	Saudi Arabia
Iceland	Congo, Republic Of	Latvia	Senegal
Ireland	Costa Rica	Lebanon	Seychelles
Italy	Cote D Ivoire	Lesotho	Sierra Leone
Japan	Croatia	Liberia	Singapore
Netherlands	Cyprus	Libya	Slovak Republic
New Zealand	Czech Republic	Lithuania	Slovenia
Norway	Chad	Luxembourg	Solomon Islands
Portugal	Chile	Macedonia, Fyr	Somalia
San Marino	China,P.R.: Mainland	Madagascar	South Africa
Spain	China,P.R.:Hong Kong	Malawi	Sri Lanka
Sweden	Djibouti	Malaysia	St. Kitts And Nevis
Switzerland	Dominica	Maldives	St. Lucia
United Kingdom	Dominican Republic	Mali	St. Vincent & Grens.
United States	Ecuador	Malta	Sudan
Afghanistan, I.S. Of	Egypt	Marshall Islands	Suriname
Albania	El Salvador	Mauritania	Swaziland
Algeria	Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Syrian Arab Republic
Angola	Estonia	Mexico	Tajikistan
Antigua And Barbuda	Ethiopia	Micronesia, Fed.Sts.	Tanzania
Argentina	Fiji	Moldova	Thailand
Armenia	Gabon	Mongolia	Togo
Aruba	Gambia, The	Morocco	Tonga
Azerbaijan	Georgia	Mozambique	Trinidad And Tobago
Bahamas, The	Ghana	Myanmar	Tunisia
Bahrain	Grenada	Namibia	Turkey
Bangladesh	Guatemala	Nepal	Turkmenistan
Barbados	Guinea	Netherlands Antilles	Uganda
Belarus	Guinea-Bissau	Nicaragua	Ukraine
Belize	Guyana	Niger	United Arab Emirates
Benin	Haiti	Nigeria	Uruguay
Bhutan	Honduras	Oman	Vanuatu
Bolivia	Hungary	Pakistan	Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Bosnia And Herzegovina	India	Palau	Vietnam
Botswana	Indonesia	Panama	Yemen, Republic Of
Brazil	Iran, I.R. Of	Papua New Guinea	Zambia
Brunei Darussalam	Iraq	Paraguay	Zimbabwe
Bulgaria	Israel	Peru	

Industrial countries in bold.

APPENDIX 2

White's efficient 2SIV estimates

The estimation in Table 12 shows the results corresponding to White's (White, 1984) efficient 2SIV (two-stage instrumental variable) estimator. This procedure delivers the asymptotically efficient estimator among the class of IV estimators, even in the presence of a nonspherical variance covariance matrix (VCV) for the error term in the structural equation. Consider the structural equation for variable i :

$$y_i = X_i \mathbf{d}_i + \mathbf{e}_i,$$

where the matrix X includes both endogenous and exogenous variables. In our specification y_i corresponds to the real per capita GDP growth rate and X includes both the exogenous regressors in the growth equation as well as the endogenous regime dummy. The White heteroskedasticity test mentioned in footnote 15 suggests that the VCV matrix of \mathbf{e} is nonspherical, i.e.

$$V(\mathbf{e}_i) = \Omega.$$

As is well known we can estimate consistently our parameter of interest, δ , by finding the value of δ that minimizes the quadratic distance from zero of $Z'(y - X\delta)$, i.e.

$$\hat{\mathbf{d}} = \min_{\mathbf{d}} (\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{X}\mathbf{d})' \mathbf{Z}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{Z}' (\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{X}\mathbf{d}),$$

where \mathbf{Z} indicates a set of instrumental variables. \mathbf{R} corresponds to any symmetric positive definite matrix, which must be chosen appropriately, however, in order to achieve asymptotic efficiency. The estimator corresponding to the minimization problem is:

$$\hat{\mathbf{d}} = (\mathbf{X}' \mathbf{Z}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{Z}' \mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' \mathbf{Z}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{Z}' \mathbf{y}. \quad (1)$$

It can be shown the limiting distribution of $\hat{\mathbf{d}}$ is

$$\sqrt{T}(\hat{\mathbf{d}} - \mathbf{d}) \approx N(0, p \lim[(\mathbf{Q}' \mathbf{R}\mathbf{Q})^{-1} (\mathbf{Q}' \mathbf{R}\mathbf{V}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{Q}) (\mathbf{Q}' \mathbf{R}\mathbf{Q})^{-1}]),$$

where

$$\mathbf{Q} = p \lim \frac{\mathbf{Z}' \mathbf{X}}{T}, \quad (2)$$

$$\mathbf{V} = \text{var}(T^{-1/2} \mathbf{Z}' \mathbf{e}).$$

Proposition 4.45 in White (1984) proves that choosing $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{V}^{-1}$ provides the asymptotically efficient IV estimator. In this case, the distribution of the estimator is

$$\sqrt{T}(\hat{\mathbf{d}} - \mathbf{d}) \approx N(0, p \lim(\mathbf{Q}' \mathbf{V}^{-1} \mathbf{Q})^{-1}). \quad (3)$$

Thus, if we choose R to obtain the asymptotically efficient estimator, we need an estimator of V . However, because the ε 's are not observable, we need consistent estimators of the errors in order to construct a feasible estimator for the VCV. Thus the procedure is as follows. We first run a multinomial logit regression for the regime dummies, our endogenous variables. This multinomial logit equation includes the exogenous variables in the original structural equation plus the additional exogenous variables discussed in the text, which are correlated with the choice of regime. The estimated probabilities of the regimes are used as an instrument of the regime dummies in the original specification.⁴² This simple IV estimator is used to obtain a consistent estimate for the ε 's, which are then used to estimate a consistent estimate of V , \hat{V} , as:

$$\hat{V} = \frac{\sum_t z_t' \hat{\varepsilon}_t^2 z_t}{T},$$

which allows for heteroskedasticity. Using \hat{V} we can implement the estimator $\hat{\mathbf{d}}$ as in (1) and compute its VCV matrix as in (3).

⁴² We thank Jerry Hausman for suggesting this procedure to us.

TABLE 1. DE FACTO CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA

	Se	SDe	Sr
Flexible	High	High	Low
Intermediate	Medium	Medium	Medium
Fixed	Low	Low	High
Inconclusive	Low	Low	Low

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF REGIMES

Regime	All	LYS (<i>de facto</i>)		IMF (<i>de jure</i>)
		Ind.	Non-Ind.	
Float	662	207	454	505
Intermediate	600	95	503	844
Fix	1029	141	886	942
Total	2291	443	1848	2291

Source: IMF (*de jure*) from the International Financial Statistics.
 LYS (*de facto*), from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).

TABLE 3. RATE AND VOLATILITY OF REAL PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH (% PER YEAR)

		IMF			LYS			Industrials			Non-Industrials		
		FLOAT	INT	FIX	FLOAT	INT	FIX	FLOAT	INT	FIX	FLOAT	INT	FIX
Observations		503	843	940	661	598	1027	207	95	141	454	503	886
ΔGDP	Means	1.0	2.0	1.2	1.9	1.0	1.5	2.3	1.5	2.3	1.7	0.9	1.3
	<i>Medians</i>	1.7	2.3	1.1	2.2	1.5	1.5	2.5	1.7	2.3	1.9	1.5	1.3
GDPV	Means	3.8	3.1	4.8	3.4	4.0	4.3	2.2	1.9	1.8	4.0	4.4	4.7
	<i>Medians</i>	2.3	2.2	3.8	2.3	2.8	3.4	1.8	1.8	1.6	2.7	3.2	3.8

Source: IMF's International Financial Statistics

Exchange rate classifications: IMF *de jure* from IFS, LYS *de facto* from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)

TABLE 4. FAST AND SLOW GROWERS

		Full Sample		
		FAST GROWERS	SLOW GROWERS	P-value
Observations		80	81	
ΔGDP	Mean	3.38	-0.14	
	Median	3.06	0.12	
PERCFIX	Mean	0.40	0.48	0.083¹
GDPV	Mean	3.43	4.63	0.002 ¹
	Median	3.15	4.25	0.006 ²

Mean growth rate (whole sample): 1.61

		Industrials		
		FAST GROWERS	SLOW GROWERS	P-value
Observations		11	11	
ΔGDP	Mean	2.85	1.69	
	Median	2.74	1.77	
PERCFIX	Mean	0.42	0.32	0.284¹
GDPV	Mean	2.02	1.77	0.153 ¹
	Median	1.79	1.88	0.670 ²

Mean growth rate (whole sample): 2.27

		Non-Industrials		
		FAST GROWERS	SLOW GROWERS	P-value
Observations		69	70	
ΔGDP	Mean	3.42	-0.39	
	Median	3.18	-0.01	
PERCFIX	Mean	0.36	0.55	0.002¹
GDPV	Mean	4.28	4.46	0.344 ¹
	Median	3.49	4.25	0.014 ²

Mean growth rate (whole sample): 1.50

¹ Test of means.

² Test of medians.

TABLE 5. GROWTH REGRESSIONS
(ANNUAL DATA)

	(i) IMF Baseline	(ii) LYS Baseline	(iii) LYS Industrial	(iv) LYS Non-industrial	(v) IMF	(vi) IMF ¹
INVGD	10.01*** (1.74)	9.83*** (1.73)	7.06** (3.07)	10.36*** (2.01)	10.29*** (2.12)	7.73*** (2.09)
POPGR	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.35* (0.19)	-0.56 (0.35)	-0.30 (0.22)	-0.34 (0.21)	-0.30 (0.21)
GDP74	-0.37*** (0.14)	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.34*** (0.12)	-0.77** (0.38)	-0.38** (0.19)	-0.71*** (0.24)
SEC	-0.07 (1.07)	-0.05 (1.03)	2.11* (1.11)	0.18 (1.44)	-0.84 (1.40)	0.52 (1.60)
POP	0.19** (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.30 (0.21)	0.12 (0.09)	0.30** (0.12)	0.26** (0.11)
GOV(-1)	-1.03*** (0.37)	-0.92** (0.38)	4.27** (2.11)	-0.98** (0.39)	-1.10** (0.49)	-3.57*** (0.98)
CIVIL	-0.24* (0.14)	-0.24* (0.14)	-0.98*** (0.23)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.17)
ΔTT	0.50*** (0.10)	0.50*** (0.10)	0.52** (0.24)	0.49*** (0.11)	0.53*** (0.12)	0.82*** (0.13)
OPENFR	0.55 (1.20)	0.85 (1.26)	-0.49 (1.15)	1.16 (1.62)	1.33 (2.12)	0.23 (1.19)
SAFRICA	-0.77 (0.50)	-1.06** (0.47)		-1.12** (0.51)	-1.23 (0.75)	-1.16* (0.61)
LATAM	-1.02*** (0.36)	-1.11*** (0.35)		-0.96** (0.38)	-1.50*** (0.57)	-0.72 (0.50)
TRANS	-0.57 (1.80)	-1.37 (1.70)		-1.41 (1.79)	-0.68 (2.45)	-6.25 (4.93)
INT	0.54* (0.32)	-0.96*** (0.33)	-0.37 (0.29)	-1.19*** (0.45)		
FIX	-0.28 (0.43)	-0.78** (0.33)	0.13 (0.29)	-1.13** (0.47)	-0.40 (0.50)	-1.56** (0.71)
Obs.	1421	1421	392	1029	840	785
R2	0.177	0.180	0.393	0.171	0.163	0.249

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

¹ Includes de jure fixes with exchange rate volatility lower than the median for the whole sample ($\sigma_e < 0.3\%$), and de jure floaters with volatility of reserves lower than the median for the whole sample ($\sigma_r < 6.0\%$).

TABLE 6. OUTPUT VOLATILITY REGRESSIONS
(ANNUAL DATA)

	(i) All	(ii) Ind	(iii) Non-Ind
INVGDPV	22.40*** (3.67)	22.42*** (8.35)	20.74*** (3.84)
GOVV	1.53*** (0.38)	3.63 (2.92)	1.50*** (0.38)
TTV	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)
OPENFR	-0.41 (0.29)	1.49** (0.66)	-1.06*** (0.35)
GDP74	0.16*** (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.53*** (0.09)
CIVIL	0.24*** (0.05)	0.09 (0.17)	0.16** (0.06)
SAFRICA	0.70*** (0.19)		0.68*** (0.20)
LATAM	0.78*** (0.15)		0.44** (0.18)
TRANS	1.65*** (0.55)		1.05* (0.57)
LYSINT	0.25* (0.14)	-0.60*** (0.20)	0.58*** (0.18)
LYSFIX	0.39*** (0.14)	-0.56*** (0.21)	0.80*** (0.18)
Obs.	1557	405	1152
R2	0.226	0.280	0.196

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 7. SINGLE CROSS SECTION GROWTH REGRESSIONS
(PERIOD AVERAGES, 1974-1999)

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)
	LR ¹					Non Industrials	Non Industrials
	1960-1989	1974-1989	1974-1989	1974-2000	1974-2000	1974-2000	1974-2000
INVGDP	17.49** 2.68	13.79*** (5.20)	15.93*** (4.76)	10.82** (4.20)	9.24** (3.82)	10.65** (4.51)	10.71** (4.66)
POPGR	-0.38 0.22	-0.71*** (0.20)	-0.67*** (0.19)	-0.42** (0.19)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.22)
GDP74	-0.35** 0.14	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.51*** (0.18)	-0.26* (0.16)	-0.57*** (0.15)	-0.60** (0.26)	-0.65*** (0.24)
SEC	3.17** 1.29	2.90** (0.11)	1.91 (1.17)	2.18* (1.15)	1.10 (1.33)	0.99 (1.58)	1.14 (1.59)
POP					0.14 (0.12)	0.13 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)
GOV(-1)					-1.28 (1.08)	-1.57 (1.16)	-1.39 (1.15)
CIVIL					-0.39 (0.25)	-0.34 (0.29)	-0.33 (0.29)
OPENFR					0.11*** (0.03)	0.14** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
SAFRICA					-0.89 (0.61)	-0.72 (0.73)	-0.80 (0.71)
LATAM					-1.17** (0.54)	-1.03 (0.64)	-1.03 (0.64)
TRANS					0.39 (0.56)	0.43 (0.71)	-0.12 (0.69)
PERCFIX			-1.37*** (0.51)	-1.13*** (0.41)	-1.30*** (0.44)	-1.89** (0.77)	
LYSAVG							-1.13** (0.47)
Obs.	101	88	88	97	95	73	73
R2	0.46	0.408	0.455	0.374	0.524	0.522	0.523

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹ Levine and Renelt (1992), column (i) of table 5.

TABLE 8. INCLUDING HIGH CREDIBILITY PEGS

	(i)	(ii) Are high Credibility Pegs Different?
INVGDP	9.40*** (1.59)	9.45*** (1.61)
POPGR	-0.39** (0.17)	-0.39** (0.17)
GDP74	-0.52*** (0.15)	-0.52*** (0.15)
SEC	0.28 (1.01)	0.30 (1.01)
POP	0.23*** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.08)
GOV(-1)	-0.97*** (0.37)	-0.97*** (0.37)
CIVIL	-0.25** (0.12)	-0.25** (0.12)
ΔTT	0.60*** (0.10)	0.60*** (0.10)
OPENFR	0.84*** (0.31)	0.81** (0.33)
SAFRICA	-1.19*** (0.41)	-1.17*** (0.42)
LATAM	-0.92*** (0.31)	-0.92*** (0.31)
TRANS	-1.54 (1.70)	-1.55 (1.70)
INT	-0.91*** (0.32)	-0.91*** (0.32)
FIX	-0.60** (0.29)	-0.65** (0.29)
UNCONT		0.14 (0.36)
Obs.	1754	1754
R2	0.183	0.183

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 9. INCLUDING ADDITIONAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES

	(i) Baseline specification	(ii) Baseline specification w/o intermediates	(iii) Single cross section ¹
INVGD	10.36*** (1.86)	8.64*** (2.02)	8.88** (3.88)
POPGR	-0.40** (0.19)	-0.39* (0.21)	-0.14 (0.20)
GDP74	-0.50*** (0.13)	-0.40*** (0.15)	-0.51*** (0.16)
SEC	0.79 (1.06)	1.00 (1.25)	1.23 (1.25)
POP	0.15* (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.14 (0.11)
GOV(-1)	-0.70 (0.53)	0.78 (0.93)	1.28 (1.19)
CIVIL	-0.16 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.33 (0.25)
ΔTT	0.48*** (0.10)	0.54*** (0.13)	
OPENFR	0.68 (1.36)	0.82 (1.61)	0.11*** (0.03)
INF(-1)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.08)	
INF			-0.29*** (0.10)
CURR	-1.07*** (0.34)	-0.77* (0.40)	0.14 (1.36)
BANK	-1.24*** (0.44)	-1.25** (0.58)	0.65 (1.62)
SAFRICA	-0.93* (0.48)	-0.82 (0.55)	-0.91 (0.57)
LATAM	-0.82** (0.36)	-0.97** (0.41)	-1.30** (0.50)
TRANS	-1.94 (1.74)	-0.77 (1.29)	-0.11 (0.66)
INT	-1.00*** (0.32)		
FIX	-0.71** (0.33)	-0.57 (0.35)	
PERCFIX			-1.09** (0.44)
Obs.	1339	940	95
R2	0.202	0.183	0.568

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 10 . COUNTRIES WITH GDPPC74 > MEDIAN

	(i) Whole period	(ii) 90's	(iii) Additional variables
INVGD	10.91*** (4.11)	14.13*** (3.73)	10.38** (4.33)
POPGR	-0.32 (0.27)	0.38 (0.72)	-0.42 (0.29)
GDP74	-0.45 (0.44)	-0.65 (0.70)	-0.51 (0.44)
SEC	1.80 (3.63)	-4.20 (4.06)	-0.75 (3.95)
POP	1.01 (1.29)	0.09 (1.52)	2.27 (1.40)
GOV(-1)	-1.20 (0.77)	-1.19 (1.00)	-2.50** (1.04)
CIVIL	-0.24 (0.27)	-0.75* (0.41)	-0.14 (0.27)
ΔTT	0.41*** (0.15)	0.20 (0.12)	0.27 (0.17)
OPENFR	0.80 (1.31)	1.73 (1.20)	1.89* (1.07)
SAFRICA	-1.14 (1.18)	-2.92* (1.55)	-1.68 (1.31)
LATAM	-1.06 (0.72)	0.74 (1.12)	0.10 (0.72)
TRANS	-2.89 (2.02)	0.78 (2.41)	-1.98 (1.97)
INF(-1)			0.11* (0.06)
CURR			-0.93 (0.80)
BANK			-3.61*** (0.89)
LYSINT	-1.99*** (0.66)	-2.00** (0.86)	-1.32** (0.64)
LYSFIX	-2.09*** (0.60)	-1.61** (0.79)	-1.97*** (0.59)
Obs.	326	148	305
R2	0.288	0.320	0.354

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 11. DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY

	(i) OLS	(ii) Baseline 2SIV	(iii) Baseline 2SIV	(iv) Baseline IV
INVGD	9.91*** (1.79)	11.33*** (1.84)	11.20*** (1.85)	12.14*** (1.94)
POPGR	-0.34* (0.19)	-0.34* (0.19)	-0.33* (0.19)	-0.33* (0.19)
GDP74	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.43*** (0.14)	-0.42*** (0.14)	-0.43*** (0.14)
SEC	-0.03 (1.01)	0.22 (1.19)	0.29 (1.18)	0.34 (1.19)
POP	0.15* (0.08)	0.12 (0.11)	0.15 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)
GOV(-1)	-0.93** (0.38)	-1.28*** (0.50)	-1.30*** (0.50)	-1.47*** (0.51)
CIVIL	-0.24* (0.14)	-0.24* (0.15)	-0.25* (0.14)	-0.25* (0.15)
Δ TT	0.50*** (0.10)	0.53*** (0.11)	0.53*** (0.11)	0.53*** (0.11)
OPENFR	0.91 (1.16)	2.29 (1.48)	2.10 (1.45)	3.01* (1.65)
SAFRICA	-1.03** (0.52)	-0.07 (0.68)	-0.09 (0.66)	0.43 (0.75)
LATAM	-1.11*** (0.35)	-0.91*** (0.36)	-0.92*** (0.35)	-0.81** (0.37)
TRANS	-1.36 (1.71)	-1.47 (1.80)	-1.31 (1.80)	-1.51 (1.83)
INT	-0.96*** (0.33)	-0.19 (1.75)	0.20 (1.73)	0.23 (1.78)
FIX	-0.76** (0.35)	-2.89*** (1.07)	-2.55** (1.04)	-3.95*** (1.35)
FIXALL	-0.12 (0.63)			
Obs.	1421	1403	1403	1403

***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in italics.

(i) FIXALL denotes observations corresponding to economies classified as *de jure* pegs during the whole period (1974-2000).

(ii) Instruments: INTFIT and FIXFIT, where INTFIT and FIXFIT are the estimates of INT and FIX in a multinomial logit model

(iii) Instruments: INTFIT, FIXFIT, AREA, ISLAND, REGEXCH, RESBASE, and SIZE.

(iv) Instruments: AREA, ISLAND, REGEXCH, RESBASE and SIZE.

TABLE 12

	Multinomial logit	
	LYSINT	LYSFIX
AREA	-0.13 (2.68)	-0.56*** (0.12)
ISLAND	-0.33** (0.15)	0.24* (0.14)
REGEXCH	-0.06 (0.19)	1.65*** (0.20)
RESBASE	0.31** (0.12)	0.69*** (0.11)
SIZE	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Obs.	2162	2162

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%